Opposition to the Legitimacy of Hate Crime Laws: The Role of Argument Acceptance, Knowledge, Individual Differences, and Peer Influence

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Hate Crime laws are a highly controversial legal approach in society’s response to intergroup violence. Argument acceptance, knowledge, and individual differences were examined in relationship to attitudes about these laws. These variables were also considered in terms of efforts to influence a peer’s beliefs about hate crime laws. One-hundred and sixty-seven participants completed a measure of knowledge of human rights laws, Gough’s Pr scale, the Selznick and Steinberg anti-Semitism scale, and Cuellar’s Machismo scale. Hate crime attitudes were measured on an affect rating scale and six statements reflecting arguments favoring and opposing hate crime laws. Peer influence was examined on Interpersonal Power Inventory (IPI). Results showed that while most participants endorsed positive attitudes about hate crime laws, men—and both women and men who endorsed machismo attitudes—were more likely to agree with media distortion and identity politics arguments opposing hate crime laws. The Pr and machismo scales predicted greater effort on the IPI to influence peer attitudes about hate crime laws, after controlling for demographic differences of the participants. These findings indicate that more explicitly biased individuals were more effortful in trying to change the attitudes of peers concerning the legitimacy of hate crime laws. Hate crimes, and polices meant to enforce them, are a controversial legal remedy to a chronic American dilemma. Since the passage of the 1990 federal hate crimes statistics reporting act and passage in 1994 of a federal sentencing act for hate crime offenders, critics of hate crime legislation have argued the laws are divisive (Jacobs & Potter, 1998) and that the laws “don’t work” as a deterrent to...
intergroup violence. At the same time, many young adults express concern about hate crimes. National survey research conducted in 1999 found that 95% of young people support the expansion of hate crime laws. Seventeen percent of the 12- to 24-year-old survey respondents reported knowing someone who had been the victim of a hate crime (http://edworkforce.house.gov/democrats/hr1900views.html).

The study of social attitudes has employed a number of methodological and conceptual strategies. It has increasingly been recognized that research examining social issues needs to consider the independent role of cognitive, affective, and situational variables (Zanna, 1994). In their research on attitudes about capital punishment Haddock and Zanna (1999) emphasize the importance of examining the unique role that cognitions, affects, and judgments play in attitude formation. They observe how greater predictive power and construct clarity is possible when research incorporates a multidimensional strategy.

The recent study of attitudes about civil rights has revealed the importance of both beliefs relevant to the issue—such as fairness of employment laws—and individual differences such as political orientation (Kravitz et al., 2000). Aberson and Haag (2003) observed that both attitudes and individual differences predicted the favorableness in how affirmative action laws were viewed. The limited information concerning attitudes about hate crime laws has suggested that negative feelings about gays and lesbians may increase opposition to these laws (Johnson & Byers, 2003). Consistent with the guidance of Haddock and Zanna (1999) the current study employed a multidimensional strategy to examine attitudes and behavioral intentions concerning hate crime laws. The current study examined how cognitive, demographic, and individual difference variables shape attitudes about hate crime laws. This was done by examining the relationships between cognitions—that is, acceptance of arguments concerning the legitimacy of hate crimes laws and knowledge about human rights laws, participant social category differences: gender, age, and political orientation—and individual difference variables related to outgroup bias. Additionally, this study considered how these same sets of variables were predictive of efforts to influence a peer’s attitudes concerning hate crimes laws.

**Arguments Concerning the Legitimacy of Hate Crime Laws**

Arguments in opposition to hate crime laws in the United States suggest that the legal standard is both arbitrary and unenforceable under state of federal guidelines. Critics of hate crimes question whether these offenses are in any objective sense distinguishable from other crimes (Jacobs & Potter, 1998). Gellman (1991) has argued that hate crime laws penalize not only free speech, but freedom of thought as well. It has additionally been suggested that these laws are the result of special interest group efforts to influence law makers to craft legislation that
meets the identity politics needs of their constituencies (Sykes, 1992). Libertarian political theory would also argue against the federal government mandate regarding hate crimes (http://www.LP.org/Libertarian Party - Release - 20000221 - hate crimes.html; http://www.cincypost.com/2003/01/25/edita012503.html). States rights proponents would rather leave the question of prosecution of bias-motivated crimes at a community or state level. Many political conservatives additionally feel that hate crimes are sensationalized by the media (http://dm.olemiss.edu/archives/98/9807/980716/980716ED3renick.HTML). This argument proposes that “all crimes are motivated by hate” (http://www.ccv.org/Cincy_Hate_Crimes.htm) and that discussion of a high-profile case such as the Matthew Sheppard torture and homicide—which was subsequently depicted in a television movie—obscure the everyday realities of violence in the United States.

The arguments that support hate crime laws and policies recognize that these laws are part of an effort to promote the maintenance of a civil society. Hate crime laws are particularly important, so goes this line of argument, given the significant ethnic change and in-migration experienced by the United States during the past 50 years. These laws are a recent example of social engineering (Myrdal, 1944), one which serves to create safeguards against intergroup violence for all members of society and not special interests (Taslitz, 1999; Sullaway, in press). Researchers have additionally focused upon the specific vulnerabilities faced by many victims of hate crimes (Garnets, Herek, & Levy, 1992; Herek, Gillis, Cogan, & Glunt, 1996; Garnets, 1997). Hate crime laws therefore protect members of outgroups traditionally under-served and marginalized by law enforcement and the legal system (Waldrep, 2001). Finally, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, human relations advocates have expressed particular concern about the need to guard against the escalation of retaliatory intergroup violence. In this regard, hate crime laws have been described by researchers such as Hamm (1993, 2001) as constituting acts of domestic terrorism.

Attitudes concerning hate crime laws may also signify other beliefs concerning intergroup issues. Opposition to these laws may be related to the endorsement of explicit forms of outgroup bias. As has been suggested previously in the study of symbolic racism (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Jacobsen, 1985), bias against racial outgroups may be referenced via opposition to policies that seek to establish workplace equity, such as affirmative action, or housing rights. Opposition to hate crime laws may simply represent a symbolic form of ethnic or gender bias, for example.

Knowledge of the Law and Hate Crime Attitudes

Human rights constitute an international concern. Creating legal protections for voting rights, fair employment, the rights of women, and freedom of speech
are important elements of a civil society (Weisbrodt, 1988). The issue of inter-group violence is part of the human rights agenda. Domestically, the U.S. government and internationally the United Nations (United Nations Website, 2003) have both endorsed numerous initiatives to promote intercultural involvement and understanding. These initiatives have included school violence prevention, neighborhood dispute resolution, and educational programs about tolerance, the legal system, and human rights.

As part of this effort, political psychologists have studied citizen comprehension of civil rights laws (Davies, 2000). Price (1993) has proposed that legal knowledge, ideological sophistication, and opinion change are three significant areas in the formation of attitudes about the law. There is some evidence that possession of accurate knowledge about human rights in general may be related to attitudes about laws protecting minority groups. Research in the European Union has found a relationship between knowledge of human rights laws and positive feelings about these laws (Dunbar, Blanco, Sullaway, & Horcajo, 2004). In an earlier study, knowledge about policies pertaining to human rights enforcement was predictive of more positive feelings about human rights laws in general (Dunbar, Sullaway, Blanco, Horcajo, & Cortes, 2003).

### Individual Differences, Bias, and Attitudes about Hate Crimes

Social category differences such as gender (Campbell, 1971; Carter, 1990) and age (Pope-Davis & Ottavi, 1994) have been found to be associated with racism as well as social attitudes concerning employment rights (Kravitz et al., 2000). In their survey research on hate crime attitudes, Johnson and Byers (2003) had proposed that men would be more opposed to hate crime laws than women and that socially liberal individuals would be more supportive of hate crime laws than socially conservative persons. Political orientation and feelings about the political system may play a role in attitudes concerning civil rights (Reef & Knoke, 1993).

There is an abundant literature on the endorsement of a male-dominant worldview as a factor in outgroup bias. As Sidanius has proposed in his study of social dominance, a male-dominant worldview constitutes an important element in the support for inequity between groups (Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994). Payne (1995) has likewise linked a male-centric worldview to many of the fascistic political movements of the first half of the twentieth century. Machismo (Cuellar, Harris, & Jassco, 1980), similarly, may constitute a stable belief system. As Casas, Wagenheim, Banchero, and Mendoza-Romero (1994) have noted, machismo represents the strong adherence to a male gender identity, one that is not per se exclusively a characteristic of Latino culture. Such a belief system may include a tough-minded approach to civil rights issues—that is, hate crime laws are an “excuse abuse” and it is up to the individual to “get over it” on their own. As
Cuellar, Arnold, and Gonzalez note, “Machismo involves learned gender role behaviors which are known to be most resistive to change” (1995, p. 241). Estrada’s (1998) meta-analysis of bias reduction initiatives noted that gender differences played a significant role in the failure of tolerance education initiatives to reduce anti-gay and lesbian bias. It may therefore be expected that both gender and gender attitudes independently influence opinions concerning hate crime laws.

Less explicit forms of an orientation toward bias may additionally shape attitudes about hate crime laws. Gough’s measure of intergroup bias, the Prejudice (Pr) scale, has demonstrated relationships to anti-Semitism (Gough, 1951) and racism (Dunbar, 1995). The scale, which measures subjective experiences of guardedness, cynicism, and negative affect, is also called the Tolerance (To) Scale on the California Psychological Inventory (Gough & Bradley, 1993). Research with Pr has demonstrated cross-cultural validity in predicting endorsement of anti-Semitic and Roma (Gitano) bias in the Czech Republic (Dunbar & Simonova, 2003). Pr has also been found to predict hostility toward indigenous persons (Mapuche Indians) in Chile (Dunbar, Saiz, Stela, & Saiz, 1999). In this study, Pr was found to predict outgroup bias after ingroup-outgroup value dissimilarity had been accounted for. Individual difference variables pertaining to bias, which are both explicit, such as a measure of anti-Semitic stereotypes, or implicit, as reflected in the significantly more ambiguous Pr scale, may both influence attitudes concerning laws designed to protect social outgroups.

**Peer Influence and Attitudes about Hate Crimes**

An important aspect of intergroup attitude formation is found in peer relationships (Fishbein, 2002). Informal peer relationships may influence attitudes about outgroups and laws to protect them. Understanding how peers, in equal status situations, would try and influence each other about hate crime laws could provide useful information about strategies to foster intergroup relations.

One means to examine peer influence about hate crimes is found in the research on social power of French and Raven (1959). Their model identifies the varying forms of interpersonal influence, which are employed in situations of attitude change, task compliance, and conformity (Kipnis, Castell, Gergen, & Mauch, 1976; Gold, 2001). Raven has subsequently distinguished between “hard” and “soft” influence strategies. Hard strategies include actions that seek to control the individual through threat, coercion, explicit reward, and use of formal position of authority. Soft social power strategies employ relationship-enhancing behaviors, logic-based arguments, and interdependent or “referent” forms of establishing compliance (Raven, 1992).

The French and Raven model provides a construct-rich approach to the investigation of peer influence concerning hate crime laws. Additionally, considering
how specific attitudes about hate crime laws—for example, ascribing to an identity politics argument—are related to these social power strategies can help to clarify the ideological and motivational factors in the public debate about these laws. This is important given the wide array of media and educational efforts which seek to create positive attitudes about the role of hate crime enforcement.

The issue of peer influence has also been found to be a function of both gender and bias orientation. Gender differences have also been found to influence endorsement of social power strategies (Carli, 2001). Dunbar et al. (2004) found that men and women differed in their effort to influence a peer’s beliefs concerning the civil rights of ethnic minorities, with men using more hard influence strategies. In this study it was also found that efforts to influence a peer’s beliefs about human rights was predicted by the endorsement of explicit ethnic and gender bias, as well as an orientation toward bias as measured on the Gough Pr measure. That is, individuals who expressed an overt bias toward outgroups were consistently more forceful in seeking the agreement of a peer concerning human rights than were persons who expressed a less explicit bias against outgroups. As such, a bias orientation that is at once explicit in terms of self-report, and implicit, as reflected in the Gough measure, can be expected to produce more effort to have peers ascribe to attitudes about hate crimes.

Research Questions

This study examined two interrelated questions about hate crime laws. One of the goals of this study is to examine the relationships between how argument acceptance, legal knowledge, and individual differences influenced feelings about hate crime laws. In addition, this study examined how these variables were related to efforts to have a peer agree with the participant’s beliefs about hate crime laws.

Four hypotheses based upon prior research were proposed. In addition, two exploratory research questions were investigated.

$H1$: Positive feelings about hate crime laws would be predicted by possession of accurate knowledge of human rights laws, when controlling for participant age, gender, and political orientation. This would cross-culturally replicate the Dunbar et al. (2004) findings.

$H2$: Negative feelings about hate crime laws would be correlated with the Gough Pr scale, the Machismo scale, and the Selznick and Steinberg anti-Semitism scale, when controlling for demographic differences of the participant.

$H3$: Both hard and soft strategies to influence a peer’s attitudes about hate crimes would be predicted by participant age, gender, and political orientation, the Pr scale, the Machismo scale, and the Selznick and Steinberg anti-Semitism scale. It was anticipated that women and (self-referenced) politically liberal participants would demonstrate more effort to use soft influence strategies. The measures of intergroup hostility, Pr, Machismo, and anti-Semitism were expected to predict to both hard and soft peer influence strategies, again replicating the Dunbar et al. findings.
Opposition to Hate Crime Laws

H4: It was anticipated that men and women would differ in their endorsement of strategies to influence a peer’s attitudes about hate crime laws; it was hypothesized that men would endorse a greater effort to influence a peer’s beliefs.

R1: An exploratory research question examined whether the measures of bias orientation and negative feelings about hate crimes would be related to argument acceptance both favoring (i.e., negatively correlated) and rejecting (i.e., positively correlated) the legitimacy of hate crime laws.

R2: A second exploratory research question sought to determine whether agreement with arguments for and against hate crimes was related to efforts to gain agreement of a peer concerning the legitimacy of these laws.

Method

Sample

One-hundred and sixty-seven students enrolled at a community college in the metropolitan Sacramento area in Northern California participated in the study.

Materials

Social Category Variables. Participant variables were coded for participant age, race/ethnicity, religion, and gender. Political orientation was measured on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from left/liberal to right/conservative. These variables were recorded on a demographic face sheet.

Human Rights Knowledge Scale. The 23-item measure of human rights laws and policies in California and the United States was developed by the first author. Scale items consisted of factual statements about human rights laws that were evaluated on a 7-point Likert scale, with statements rated from “very certain this is true” to “very certain this is not true.” The current scale is a revision of the measure employed in the Dunbar et al. (2004) study. The statements examined knowledge concerning human rights policies (“California does not have an agency responsible for monitoring the civil rights of minority groups”) and civil laws (“There are laws in the United States against the advocacy of violence against minority groups”), as well as knowledge of federal human rights practices (“The U.S. does not have a policy concerning the human rights of social groups such as Jews”). The human rights knowledge scale consists of four subscales. The first subscale measures knowledge about hate crime laws and consists of six items. The second subscale measures knowledge about laws concerning protection against discrimination (nine items), the third knowledge of laws concerning hate speech (two items), and the fourth knowledge of government policies regarding human rights enforcement; this scale consists of six items.
Hate Crime Affect. Participants were asked to describe how they felt about hate crime laws on three 7-point semantic differential measures, developed by Haddock and Zanna (1999) in their study of attitudes about capital punishment. The three affect pairs (“Positive-Negative, Good-Bad, Like-Dislike”) were aggregated to form a global rating of feelings concerning human rights laws. Higher scores indicate more negative affect.

Prejudice (Pr) Scale. The 32 items of Gough’s original Pr scale from the original version of the MMPI. This scale includes items that reflect a cynical, rigid, bitter perspective. Pr has shown cross-cultural reliability in its prediction of outgroup bias.

Machismo Scale (Cuellar et al., 1995). This 17-item measure is a subscale of the Acculturation Rating Scale for Mexican Americans-II (ARSMA-II). In prior research the measure has been used with community samples and shown to be related to both acculturative status and the acceptance of traditional familial values. The measure has evidenced satisfactory construct validity and internal reliability (\(\alpha = .75\)).

Selznick and Steinberg Anti-Semitism Scale. This is an 11-item Likert-scaled measure consisting of statements reflecting negative stereotypes of Jews and Jewish culture (1969). Scale items reflect both negative images (“Jews have a lot of irritating faults”) and distrust (“Jews are shrewd and tricky in business”) of Jews. The scale has been used in community studies in North America during the past thirty years (Matrie & Clark, 1982).

Arguments about Hate Crime Laws. Six position statements, reflecting differing arguments for and against hate crime laws were rated on a 5-point Likert scale. Participants were asked “What do you think about Hate Crime laws?” Each statement was then rated from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” with higher scores reflecting greater endorsement of each argument. The statements were coded to reflect positions of Identity Politics (opposition to the laws), Vulnerable Groups (supportive of the laws), Libertarianism (opposition), Civil Society (supportive), Social Engineering (supportive), and Media Distortion (opposition). The items are included in Table 3 below.

Interpersonal Power Inventory (IPI). This 33-item Likert-scaled measure asks respondents to describe forms of social power they would employ to gain the agreement or compliance of another (Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998). The IPI measures the forms of social power described by French and Raven (1959). The power strategies include both hard (e.g., personal coercion) and soft (e.g., information) forms of influence strategies. In the current version of the Raven
Opposition to Hate Crime Laws

Inventory, all items were worded to reflect interaction with a peer, that is, a person of equal status. Participants were asked to respond to a situation in which they were attempting to convince a peer who held an opposite opinion about hate crime laws to agree with their opinion. Participants were asked to describe the actions they would employ to gain their peer’s agreement about the legitimacy of hate crime laws. An example of a statement reflecting personal expertise (one of the “soft” influence strategies) on the IPI is “I would probably have had more knowledge about the issue than they would have,” whereas a statement such as “I could have made it more difficult for them to get some special benefits if they disagreed with me” would reflect the use of material reward (a “hard” social influence strategy). Each Raven Inventory item is scored on a 7-point Likert scale. Low values reflect a disinclination to use a certain form of social power (1 = almost certainly not a strategy) and high scores a preference to use a strategy (7 = almost certainly a strategy). Each IPI scale consisted of 3 items, allowing for a scale range from 3 to 21. For the 11 individual scales, the mean reliability coefficient (α) was .79 (range of .90 – .68).

Procedure

Participants were solicited at their community college and received academic credit for participating in the study. All subjects were enrolled in introductory anthropology classes at their college. To reduce response bias (Sundberg & Bachelis, 1956) no reference was made in participant solicitation that topics of inter-group attitudes would be sampled. All questionnaire materials were administered during regular class sessions. The administration of the materials was as follows: the Prejudice Scale was administered first, followed by the Machismo Scale, the Human Rights Knowledge Scale, the Hate Crime Affect scale, and then the Selznick and Steinberg Anti-Semitism Scale. Finally, the Arguments about Hate Crime Laws scales and the IPI was administered; the demographic fact sheet was administered after the other measures were completed. On the IPI it was emphasized that participants were to think of a situation in which they would try to change the opinion of a peer who held opposite attitudes from those of the participant concerning hate crime laws.

The completed materials were entered into a database by a research team supervised by the first author. The dataset was then analyzed in SPSS 10.5. Analysis of variance and zero-order correlations were computed to test the relationships between the independent variables. To test the predictive relationship of sets of variables for feelings about hate crime laws and to examine the question of peer influence concerning hate crime laws, hierarchical multiple regression (HMR) analysis was computed. The HMR equation allowed for the determination of the (proposed) contribution of individual difference variables—that is, machismo
attitudes, anti-Semitism, and bias orientation—after social category and cognitive variables had been accounted for in the model. This evaluative strategy was similar to that employed in the Dunbar et al. study (2004).

Results

The sample consisted of 69 men and 85 women; 9 participants did not report their gender. The average age was 20.78 years (SD = 5.97). The sample was primarily Euro-White (82.2%); 9.3% of the subjects were Latino, 5.3% were Asian-Pacific, 2% were African-American, and the remaining 1.4% were of various ethnic backgrounds. For political orientation 17.8% of the participants described themselves as liberal/left, 37% as liberal-to-moderate, 32.2% as moderate/middle, 18.5% as moderate-to-conservative, and 12.3% as conservative/right.

Feelings and Attitudes about Hate Crime Laws. The mean score for the Hate Crime Affect scale was 11.09 (SD = 7.02, Cronbach alpha = .99). Computed One-way ANOVAs for the Hate Crime Affect scale by political orientation ($\chi^2 = .04$) and gender ($\chi^2 = .08$) was not significant. The computed zero-order correlation for participant age with the Hate Crime Affect scale was also not significant.

Acceptance of Arguments about Hate Crimes. Analysis of the agreement with arguments for and against hate crime laws indicated that the greatest agreement was found for the Civil Society argument ($M = 3.72, SD = .92$) followed by the other two pro-hate crime statements for Vulnerable Groups ($M = 3.36, SD = 1.01$) and Social Engineering ($M = 3.33, SD = 1.30$). The greatest agreement for anti-hate crime statements was found for the Identity Politics ($M = 2.84, SD = .96$) argument, followed by the Media Distortion statement ($M = 2.15, SD = 1.04$) with least agreement for the Libertarian argument ($M = 1.93, SD = .95$).

Significance tests indicated that men were more likely to agree with both the Media Distortion ($t = 2.38, p < .01$) argument ($M = 2.37, SD = 1.13$) than women ($M = 1.98, SD = .93$, Cohen’s $d = 38$) and the Libertarian ($t = 1.67, p < .05$) argument ($M = 2.03, SD = 1.10$ and $M = 1.79, SD = .74$, respectively, Cohen’s $d = 26$). Computed One-way ANOVAs for each of the arguments by political orientation ($M = 2.88, SD = 1.26$) indicated that the Identity Politics ($F(4, 163) = 4.25, p < .01, \eta^2 = .32$) argument varied by political self-reference. Scheffe contrasts indicated that self-referenced liberal participants ($M = 2.23, SD = 1.03$) reported less agreement with this argument than did moderate-conservative ($M = 2.78, SD = .04$) or conservative ($M = 3.11, SD = .97$) participants. The other five hate crime arguments did not significantly vary by political orientation.
Opposition to Hate Crime Laws

Relationships between anti-Semitism, Machismo, and Pr. The relationship of the measures of anti-Semitism ($M = 27.34$, $SD = 14.92$; alpha coefficient of .94), Machismo ($M = 2.9$, $SD = 2.78$ alpha = .80), and Pr ($M = 10.49$, $SD = 4.19$, alpha = .77) were examined via zero-order correlations. All measures were intercorrelated; Pr was correlated with Machismo ($r = .35$, $p < .01$) and anti-Semitism ($r = .38$, $p < .01$). The Machismo scale revealed a more robust relationship to anti-Semitism ($r = .55$, $p < .01$). Significance tests indicated that these three variables all varied by participant gender. Pr (men $M = 11.66$, $SD = 3.91$; women, $M = 9.43$, $SD = 4.09$; $t = 3.48$, $p < .001$, Cohen’s $d = .66$), anti-Semitism, (men $M = 31.11$, $SD = 15.50$; women, $M = 24.00$, $SD = 13.71$; $t = 3.01$, $p < .01$, Cohen’s $d = 56$), and Machismo (men $M = 3.80$, $SD = 3.23$; women, $M = 2.08$, $SD = 2.09$; $t = 3.85$, $p < .001$, Cohen’s $d = 66$) all produced a higher score for men than women.

Predicting Feelings about Hate Crime Laws. The contribution of knowledge of laws and policies concerning human rights to feelings about hate crime laws was examined. A hierarchical multiple regression model was computed to test hypothesis one. On step 1 participant demographics—gender, age, and political orientation—were entered, with the Hate Crime Affect scale serving as the dependent variable. Results on step 1 were not significant ($R^2 = .02$; Adj. $R^2 = -.001$), $F = .94$, $p = n.s.$). On step 2 the four subscales for knowledge of hate crime laws ($M = 25.11$, $SD = 5.34$), anti-discrimination laws ($M = 23.01$, $SD = 2.24$), hate speech ($M = 7.83$, $SD = 3.54$) and government policies regarding human rights enforcement ($M = 36.19$, $SD = 3.13$) were simultaneously entered. Results yielded a modest if statistically significant relationship ($R^2 = .06$; Adj. $R^2 = .04$), $F = 2.44$, $p = .05$), with the subscale measuring accurate knowledge of anti-discrimination laws ($B = -.27$, $t = -2.77$, $p < .01$) significantly reducing negative affect concerning hate crime laws.

Relationships between Feelings about Human Rights and Individual Difference Variables. The relationship between the Hate Crime Affect scale and individual difference variables (hypothesis 2) was examined via zero-order correlations. The individual differences measures for Pr, Machismo, anti-Semitism, and political orientation were not significantly correlated with participant’s feelings about hate crime laws.

Predicating Peer Influence about Hate Crime Laws. Hierarchical multiple regression models were computed to examine the endorsement of aggregated IPI scores for hard ($M = 9.95$, $SD = 5.01$) and soft ($M = 24.94$, $SD = 6.93$) peer influence strategies concerning hate crime laws. Participant demographics—gender, age, and political orientation—were initially entered (step 1) into the model; this
was followed by the four Human Rights Knowledge subscales (step 2). On step 3 the Hate Crime Affect scale was entered; on step 4 the Pr scale, the Machismo scale, and the anti-Semitism scale were entered into the model. Hard social influence was predicted by participant demographic differences ($R^2 = .09$, Adj. $R^2 = .08$, $F$ Change = 5.60, $p < .001$) and the Pr ($B = .29$, $t = 2.26$, $p < .05$) and Machismo ($B = .21$, $t = 2.22$, $p < .05$) scales ($R^2 = .27$, Adj. $R^2 = .19$, $F$ Change = 7.65, $p < .001$). The variables in step 1 collectively predicted to social power use though none of the individual variables yielded significant beta weights. This is due to the interaction of the predictors, implying an intercorrelation of the demographic variables. The human rights knowledge, hate crime affect, and anti-Semitism measures were not significant predictors of hard peer influence strategies.

The use of soft peer influence strategies was predicted by participant demographic differences ($R^2 = .08$, Adj. $R^2 = .06$, $F$ Change = 4.57, $p < .01$), with younger participants less likely to use these strategies ($B = -.14$, $t = 1.96$, $p < .05$). As with the hard peer influence strategies, the human rights knowledge, hate crime affect, and anti-Semitism measures did not yield a significant relationship to the criterion measure. After the other variables had been entered in the model Pr ($B = .22$, $t = 2.68$, $p < .05$) and Machismo ($B = .27$, $t = 2.79$, $p < .05$) again were found to predict the use of influence tactics with peers. ($R^2 = .26$, Adj. $R^2 = .21$, $F$ Change = 10.12, $p < .01$). These findings are presented in Table 1.

Gender differences in the endorsement of peer influence strategies were examined in a series of independent samples significance tests. Results indicated significant gender differences on the IPI for reward-material ($t = 2.15$, $p < .05$, Cohen’s $d = 35$) and coercive-material ($t = 2.35$, $p < .05$, Cohen’s $d = 41$) based influence strategies. Men had higher scores for these influence strategies. Men also had higher scores than women on the aggregated score for the use of hard influence tactics ($t = 2.32$, $p < .05$, Cohen’s $d = 43$). These findings are presented in Table 2.

The most frequently endorsed forms of peer influence for both men and women were information, referent, and expert influence strategies. The least-endorsed forms of peer influence were found for coercive (material and personal) strategies. As such the type of social power used to debate hate crime laws is the same for men and women even though the intensity with which (the less desirable) forms of social influence of power varies for men and women.

Research question 1 sought to determine what relationship if any existed between the arguments for and against hate crimes and the measures for Pr, Machismo, anti-Semitism, and negative Hate Crime Affect. Zero-order correlations were computed for these variables. Zero-order correlations for the three anti-hate crime arguments were modestly correlated with Pr (the mean coefficient value with the three anti-hate crime arguments was .17), Machismo (mean
Table 1. Regression Results in Predicting Hard and Soft Peer Influence Strategies Concerning Peer Hate Crime Attitudes

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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-discrimination laws</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bias speech laws</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government policies</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Hate crime negative affect</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gough Pr scale</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>7.65**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Machismo Scale</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>2.26*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-Semitism</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .01, **p < .001.
Table 2. Gender Difference in Peer Influence Strategies Concerning Attitudes about Hate Crime Laws

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men (n = 69)</th>
<th>Women (n = 85)</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reward-personal</td>
<td>3.17 (1.37)</td>
<td>2.77 (1.46)</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward-material</td>
<td>2.82 (1.34)</td>
<td>2.32 (1.18)</td>
<td>2.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive-personal</td>
<td>2.57 (1.08)</td>
<td>2.26 (1.43)</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive-material</td>
<td>2.34 (1.42)</td>
<td>1.88 (1.04)</td>
<td>2.35*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate-position</td>
<td>3.25 (1.11)</td>
<td>3.13 (1.01)</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate-equity</td>
<td>2.59 (1.39)</td>
<td>2.33 (1.19)</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate-dependent</td>
<td>3.19 (1.36)</td>
<td>2.79 (1.21)</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>3.73 (1.17)</td>
<td>3.57 (1.21)</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>4.91 (1.05)</td>
<td>4.93 (1.17)</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referent</td>
<td>4.27 (1.29)</td>
<td>4.10 (1.16)</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard strategies</td>
<td>11.24 (5.76)</td>
<td>9.09 (4.25)</td>
<td>2.32*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft strategies</td>
<td>25.69 (6.74)</td>
<td>23.56 (6.23)</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05.

coefficient = .29), anti-Semitism (mean coefficient = .29), and Hate Crime Affect (mean coefficient = .11). These same variables demonstrated few significant relationships with arguments in support of hate crime laws. These results are presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Zero-Order Correlations of Pr Scale, Machismo, anti-Semitism, and Negative Hate Crime Affect with Hate Crime Arguments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Politics: Hate crime laws unfairly cater to special interest political groups.</th>
<th>Gough Pr Scale</th>
<th>Machismo</th>
<th>anti-Semitism</th>
<th>Hate Crime Affect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerable Groups: Hate crime laws help to protect groups of people who are not adequately protected by the police and the legal system.</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarianism: The government should not be involved in the enforcement of hate crime laws.</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society: Hate crime laws help to solve the problems our society faces.</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.20*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Engineering: Our society needs hate crime laws to discourage the escalation of intergroup violence.</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.19*</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Distortion: The media is at fault for making hate crime issues seem like a serious problem, when it is really not that significant an issue.</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .01. ** p < .01.
Research question 2 wanted to determine if the arguments for and against hate crime laws were related to specific peer influence strategies. As with research question 1, a clearer relationship for arguments opposing hate crimes and greater endorsement of peer influence was found for arguments supporting hate crime laws. The aggregated hard peer influence strategies were correlated with the Identity Politics ($r = .18$, $p < .05$), Libertarianism ($r = .28$, $p < .01$), Social Engineering ($r = -.19$, $p < .05$), and Media Distortion ($r = .33$, $p < .01$) arguments. Soft peer influence strategies were correlated with the Identity Politics ($r = .19$, $p < .05$) and the Media Distortion ($r = .38$, $p < .01$) arguments. These results are presented in Table 4.

**Discussion**

This study investigated young adults’ attitudes about hate crime laws in terms of their emotional appraisal and acceptance of arguments for and against these laws. Knowledge concerning human rights laws and policies, demographic differences, and personal beliefs were examined in relationship to expressed attitudes and efforts to influence a peer’s beliefs about these laws. Rather than simply measuring support or opposition to these laws, the study sought to identify factors that were associated with attitudes about hate crime laws. As had been suggested by Haddock and Zanna (1999), understanding attitudes about important social issues is influenced by multiple predictors that include cognitions, affects, and judgments.

These findings largely (cross-culturally) support the Dunbar et al., research with a Spanish sample (2004) concerning the independent role of demographic &

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**Table 4. Hate Crime Arguments by Peer Influence Strategies Concerning Legitimacy of Hate Crime Laws**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Identity Politics</th>
<th>Vulnerable Groups</th>
<th>Libertarianism</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
<th>Social Engineering</th>
<th>Media Distortion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reward-personal</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.33**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward-material</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive-personal</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive-material</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.33**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate-position</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
<td>.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate-equity</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
<td>.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate-dependent</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate-reciprocity</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
<td>.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referent</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard Strategies</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.19*</td>
<td>.33**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft Strategies</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.38**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05, **p < .01.
individual difference variables in shaping attitudes about human rights issues. As was found in the prior study, the current findings underscore the role of both belief and personality variables as influencing feelings and expressed behavioral intentions concerning hate crime laws after both demographic and cognitive predictors have been accounted for.

The current study found that argument acceptance of statements supportive of hate crime laws was unrelated to how individuals felt about these laws. Feelings concerning hate crime laws were also unrelated to demographic differences, bias orientation as measured on the Pr scale, or explicit bias (e.g., anti-Semitism). Possession of knowledge about human rights laws played only a modest role in understanding how individuals felt about hate crime laws. It is interesting that the measure that specifically examined knowledge of the scope and intent of the hate crime laws was unrelated to how individuals felt about these laws.

Characteristics of Argument Acceptance Concerning Hate Crime Laws

The current findings indicated that the majority of young adults favored statements supportive of hate crime laws. This is consistent with the Johnson and Byers (2003) study, where the majority of a community sample similarly expressed support for these laws. The current study, as well as the Johnson and Byers study both are limited by issues of social desirability and respondent acquiescence. As such, perhaps more can be understood in terms of the patterns of responses in the current study, which represent explicit opposition to these laws.

The issues of gender and gender attitudes were both found to contribute to greater opposition to hate crime laws. The gender effect for greater bias-orientation among men has been discussed previously (Carter, 1990) as has the importance of a male-dominant worldview. Endorsement of machismo beliefs was related to argument acceptance of statements that opposed hate crime laws. Higher machismo beliefs were also related to rejection of the argument that hate crime laws reduced intergroup violence. Greater negative affect about hate crime laws was also modestly related with acceptance of identity politics arguments and rejection of the civil society argument. For these individuals, hate crime laws are seen as being socially divisive.

The current findings underscore the symbolic nature of opposition to hate crime laws. Consistent with the proposition of symbolic racism theory, participants who opposed hate crimes laws as a function of identity politics, who endorsed a libertarian “hands-off” argument, or who blamed the media for sensationalizing hate crimes were also more expressly anti-Semitic. As noted, individuals who agreed with arguments against hate crimes also endorsed more stringent machismo beliefs, supporting the idea of gender inequity. Prior research supports the notion that many individuals who hold negative attitudes toward minorities are motivated to appear nonprejudiced to others by attenuating their biased beliefs.
Opposition to Hate Crime Laws

(Dunton & Fazio, 1997); this would suggest that the relationship in the current study between opposition to hate crime laws and outgroup bias is, if anything, an underestimate. Endorsement of arguments opposing hate crime policies may be symbolic of a generalized xenophobia. In this condition opposition to these laws constitutes a form of “code,” one which references a bias against the outgroups that these laws were developed to protect.

Not all opinion in opposition to hate crime laws ought to be thought to reflect a symbolic form of bias. The current findings also raise the question as to whether or not there are two distinctive types of individuals who oppose hate crime laws. On the one hand, legal theorists may oppose these laws based upon legitimate concerns about the validity of these laws. On the other, as found in our findings, many individuals may oppose these laws as an extension of their opposition to intergroup equity and social justice in general.

Predictors of Peer Influence Concerning Hate Crime Laws

The present study was interested in how knowledge, feelings, and argument acceptance would contribute to young adults’ efforts to influence a peer’s attitudes about hate crime laws. It was found that greater effort to influence a peer’s beliefs about these laws was predicted by demographic differences—notably gender differences—and personal beliefs that were in turn correlated with anti-Semitic attitudes.

Individuals in their early twenties—the median age of these participants—typically spend a great deal of their daily lives around same-aged peers. They frequently interact with one another in not only entry-level jobs but also in educational settings and in recreational activities. By comparison, intergroup educational programs—as found in public institutions of higher education and through community-based organizations, are relatively brief educational initiatives. Frequently, these programs constitute less than 20 hours of a young adult’s time in a given calendar year. As such, it can be argued, naturally occurring social relationships constitute an important arena in which attitudes about social issues—and bias crime laws—are continuously reinforced. The role of peer influence in shaping attitudes about hate crime laws may constitute an important and somewhat neglected issue in human relations practice.

In the current study, participants’ feelings concerning hate crime laws were assessed in terms of the affect dimensions used by Haddock and Zanna (1999) to study attitudes about capital punishment. The semantic pairs (i.e., good-bad, positive-negative, like-dislike) reflect appraisal of at least one component of attitudes concerning hate crime laws. However, it may be that other more poignant emotional content may have yielded a more meaningful—that is, significant—difference within the participant sample. The emergent literature on affect and intergroup relations suggests that a range of more complex emotional content...
(e.g., threat, guilt, warmth) may shape attitudes concerning ethnic outgroups and by extension attitudes about hate crime laws (Mackie & Smith, 2002).

Collectively, these findings indicate that participants who were men and who endorsed a worldview that was both traditionally male-dominant and suspicious of the intentions of others (as measured on the Gough Pr scale), were likely to blame the media for distorting the issue of hate crimes and to feel that these laws were promulgated as a consequence of special interest groups. These individuals constituted the minority of our sample. When these characteristics were present, however, the individual endorsed more forceful and varied efforts to shape a peer’s beliefs about hate crime laws.

Persons who expressed more favorable attitudes about hate crime laws felt that these policies helped protect vulnerable victim groups and helped to promote societal norms. Additionally, individuals who felt more favorably about hate crime laws possessed greater knowledge of anti-discrimination laws. These individuals constituted the majority of respondents. Their positive opinions and feelings concerning hate crime laws were not, however, related to their expressed effort to influence others to share their favorable opinions about these laws.

It is hardly unimportant that explicitly biased individuals would be more effortful in trying to change another’s attitudes about hate crime laws. This does not mean that highly biased persons are, per se, more socially persuasive or dominant, though they may seek to be so. Rather, individuals who agree with arguments that support hate crime laws may be more tolerant. This might include tolerance of individuals with differing views about civil rights and anti-discrimination laws. As Walzer (1997) observes, greater commitment to intergroup tolerance is characterized by an equity valuation of those beliefs, which the individual personally disavows. In this perspective, then, accepting differences concerning beliefs about the merits of hate crime laws is consistent with a worldview that eschews control of another’s beliefs or actions. It is not a deficit of the person but rather an exemplar of the principle of equity.

What this study does not reveal is how persuasive individuals actually are in influencing others about hate crime laws. Explicitly biased individuals—who are more effortful in debating the legitimacy of hate crime laws—may actually alienate others via use of coercive social power. This may be particularly true in peer relationships, where formal power differentials cannot be used to gain the compliance of another. There is no reason to believe that less forceful efforts to change another’s beliefs—at least about hate crime laws—are less persuasive than more aggressive and controlling attempts.

It must of course be kept in mind that our study provides information on what individuals say they will do, rather than sampling actual behavior concerning interpersonal influence. Our version of the IPI is referred to by Raven as the “likelihood form of the IPI.” This version is often, though not always, correlated with expected effectiveness (Raven, personal communication, January 8, 2004).
Opposition to Hate Crime Laws

Future study of the role of peer influence upon human rights attitudes would benefit from experimental study factors that mediate the use of social power. Effort to influence a peer may also vary based upon the question of inclusion of gender or sexual orientation in these laws, which are included in only 19 and 23 of the states presently (http://www.adl.org/adl.asp). The Johnson and Byers (2003) study found that inclusion of sexual orientation in hate crime laws reduced the overall support for these laws. Similarly, it may be that greater influence between peers (particularly between men) may result when sexual orientation is proposed as a category of these laws.

Implications for Educational about Hate Crime Laws

Educational initiatives that address hate crime laws need to be considered with regard to what research tells us about creating positive intergroup attitudes, on the one hand, and the realities of how young people are presently learning about these issues, on the other. Recent survey research suggests that adolescents and young adults infrequently learn about hate crime laws through educational experiences. A national survey of school-aged youth (USA Weekend’s “Eighth Annual Back-to-School Survey,” August 18, 1995) found that nearly one-half of youth associated in their ethnic ingroups, that a third of the respondents felt their teachers expressed some form of racial prejudice, and that more than 40% felt that their schools did not promote intergroup cooperation. Another national survey conducted by Penn, Shoen & Berland Associates (http://edworkforce.house.gov/democrats/hr1900views.html) found that the majority of young people were unaware of community-based initiatives that addressed the problems of hate crimes.

The present study found that argument acceptance and feelings about hate crime laws were largely unrelated to one another. It may therefore be that differing educational strategies may be required to enhance both the judgments and feelings of young adults about hate crime laws. Creating positive feelings about the role of these laws needs to address social psychological processes that moderate these attitudes. Such interventions would need to target factors that will promote positive judgments of hate crime policies.

These findings implicitly call into question how relevant hate crime laws are to young adults, a group that arguably possesses little knowledge about hate crimes or public policies that address intergroup violence. The personal salience of hate crime laws may be contingent upon a variety of factors, such as intergroup contact or relationships with persons who have been the targets of intergroup violence. Psycho-educational interventions that address the issue of saliency to the individual or that emphasize how these laws and policies are seen as an issue of public safety—that is, the valuing of a civil society—may engender greater commitment to these issues.
Situational Characteristics of the Study

The current findings reflect the attitudes of young adults in a community that has frequently been a site of violence against gay men and lesbians (Herek et al., 1996) and anti-Semitic activity (http://www.jewishsf.com/bk020419/1c.shtml). The community had also recently witnessed the highly publicized hate-motivated violence of the Williams brothers, two young men who identified themselves as followers of hate groups such as World Church of the Creator and Aryan Nation. The brothers committed a series of fire bombings against three synagogues and an abortion clinic; they also brutally murdered a gay couple, all during calendar year 1999. The study participants certainly would have been exposed to these events via both the local and national media, through their school experiences, and their interactions with friends and family members. What the interested reader ought to consider is that the issue of bias-motivated violence was not some distant issue for this community. Rather, these findings reflect the range of opinions that may be found in an American city where both frequent acts of violence against gay men and lesbians and more sensational forms of violence are found.

Implications for Future Research

This study sought to examine how persons felt not about the occurrence of hate crimes, but rather the legal standards and practices used to address intergroup violence. Given the relative recency of hate crime laws, as well as the support of diversity education initiatives to make these laws more acceptable to the general population, future study of this issue is needed. Determining how young adults view the legitimacy, on the one hand, and the effectiveness of these laws on the other, can contribute to the design of interventions that foster more positive feelings about social justice in general, and hate crime laws specifically.

Other factors that might be expected to shape both opinions and feelings about hate crime laws include intergroup contact and salience. As Herek and Capitanio (1996) have noted, positive contact with gay and lesbian persons increases positive affect among heterosexuals. It is worth examining how positive contact with gay men and lesbians influences support for hate crime legislation, as well. The examination of attitude change concerning hate crime laws—an issue not considered in this study—may similarly be a function of mortality salience and terrorist threat theory (Greenberg et al., 1990). The elicitation of mortality-salient beliefs may moderate feelings about laws that serve to control intergroup threat, for example. Examination of the salience of these laws to the individual, and by extension their ingroup, is worth future study. Salience may reflect a “vested ingroup interest” in supporting (or opposing) the legitimacy of hate crime laws for the ingroup, on the one hand, and the endorsement of these laws as a function of commitment to a civil society, on the other.
Investigation of the relationship between participation in educational programs concerning intergroup relations and how individuals debate the issue of hate crime laws should be examined. Optimally, this would involve experimental methods to unpack the factors that influence peer influence about human rights and hate crime laws. It would be of great practical value if research were to consider the contribution of formal educational experiences, salience, and naturalistic forms of contact in shaping pro-social attitudes concerning laws to address intergroup violence.

References


Opposition to Hate Crime Laws


Queries

Q1 Author: Please check the use of this phrase “polices meant to enforce them.”
Q2 Author: Please provide complete mailing address.
Q3 Author: Please check that the change retains the intended meaning.
Q4 Author: The reference listing has Gough (1951). The citation has been changed. Please check.
Q5 Author: Please check whether the appropriate use is ‘face’ or ‘fact’ sheet.
Q6 Author: Please check what this value is.
Q7 Author: Please check what this value is.
Q8 Author: Please check what this value is.
Q9 Author: Please check these values.
Q10 Author: Please check the usage ‘bias crime laws’.
Q11 Author: Please update this reference. This reference is not cited in the text.
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